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From microfinance to inclusive financial markets:  the challenge of social 
regulation  
 
 
Susan Johnson, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath 
Bath, BA2 7AY.  s.z.Johnson@bath.ac.uk  
 
Abstract 
 
Policy towards microfinance has undergone a shift away from building financial institutions focussed 
on serving poor people to an ‘inclusive’ agenda for financial sector development, operationalized by 
some donors in an approach entitled “Making Markets Work for the Poor”.  This approach is located 
in new institutional economics and the enabling environment focus of the post-Washington 
Consensus.  Despite the way in which this inclusion agenda echoes social exclusion discourse, it 
engages with a residualist rather than relational understanding of poverty.  This leads to   an 
analytical disjuncture between its discourse and analysis overlooking the root causes of poverty and 
exclusion in relational processes. .  Arising from this, is the failure to recognise that developing 
institutions and ‘enabling’ environments requires an understanding of social institutions and their 
influence as social regulatory structures.   I illustrate how analysis can proceed to address this 
disjuncture using the example of gender relations.   
 
 
Key words:  inclusive markets, financial inclusion, social institutions, microfinance, financial sector 
development 
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From microfinance to inclusive financial markets:  the challenge of social 
regulation  
  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In the past five years microfinance has undergone a policy shift away from a focus on building 
sustainable microfinance institutions to serve poor people, to one which focuses on the development 
of the financial sector as a whole and the operation of the financial market in its enabling 
environment.  This shift to a wider financial sector or financial market development perspective is 
evident in the World Bank’s 2008 publication “Finance for All” (FFA)(World Bank 2008b) .  This move 
reflects the wider shift in development policy towards the focus on ‘getting institutions right’ of the 
Post-Washington Consensus (Gore 2000 ; World Bank 2002) but shifts  away from a focus on poverty 
to one of inclusivity of the unbanked and those on low incomes.  
 
The widened agenda of inclusive finance laid out in “Finance for All” (World Bank 2008b) is 
underpinned by research that suggests that the direct effects on poverty of access are outweighed by 
the indirect effects of financial sector development that arise through product and labour markets 
(World Bank 2008b).  The appeal of this widened agenda has been supported in the business and 
management fields by the recognition of the scale of market opportunities which the corporate 
sector is not currently reaching highlighted by works such as Prahalad’s “Fortune at the Bottom of 
the Pyramid” (2005).  This demonstrates a huge unserved market for products and services which 
incorporates a low income market even before the poorest are reached.  However, while the 
emphasis on “getting institutions right” and working with the private sector has been embraced by 
many donors,  the complete abandonment of a poverty focus has not equally been accepted.  Some 
donors have therefore collaborated in systematising an approach termed “Making Markets Work for 
the Poor” (M4P).  The origins of this lie largely with work sponsored by the UK’s Department for 
International Development (Ferrand, Gibson et al. 2004 ; Porteous 2004) (DFID 2005a) and the Asian 
Development Bank and SIDA (SIDA 2003 ; DFID 2005a).  While developed to assist intervention in a 
wide range of markets (DFID/SDC 2009b), itt has been specifically adapted and operationalized in 
financial markets such as those of South Africa and Kenya  (Gibson 2006 ; Stone, Johnson et al. 2010). 
In this approach the wider institutional development framework underpinning financial market 
development is evident, but there is an explicit focus on the inclusion of poor people.   
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This policy discourse of financial inclusion and its embodiment in through the “Making Markets Work 
for the Poor” approach can be termed the inclusive financial markets agenda and it raises the 
question of how exclusion and poverty are understood in order that inclusion can be addressed 
through policy or intervention.  The paper first argues that there is an analytical disjuncture between 
the discourse and its analysis.   The inclusive financial markets mission  directly echoes the language 
of social exclusion that developed during the 1990s in developed countries.  Hence we might expect 
these approaches to highlight the causes of exclusion or the negative consequences of existing 
inclusion and the ways these are implicated in the reproduction of poverty.   Poverty analysis has 
increasingly paid attention to the way poverty is produced rather than just its outcomes (such as 
incomes, education etc), particularly those analyses based in concepts such as social exclusion 
(Narayan, Chambers et al. 2000 ; World Bank 2000) and more recently relational approaches (Tilly 
2007 ; Mosse 2010).  These point to the need for analysis of markets which can be made to work 
better and inclusively, to connect to analysis of poverty as produced by the way poor people are 
either excluded from or engaged in markets in the first place.  However, the theoretical approach 
from which these approaches derive in the New Institutional Economics engages with a residualist 
rather than a relational view of poverty and hence does not make these connections.   
 
Second, the paper argues that since relational poverty is strongly embedded in social institutions, an 
understanding of their role in markets is necessary.  However, while the inclusive financial markets 
agenda  and the M4P approach are  centrally concerned with institutions for market development in 
the form of formal regulatory structures and ‘enabling’ environments,  this has been criticised for its 
focus on institutional form over function (Chang 2005), and for overlooking the role of underlying 
social institutions.  Moreover, in the context of economies where formal regulation is limited and/or 
ineffective and hence the reach of formal institutional arrangements is limited, Harriss-White argues 
that the economy is primarily subject to forms of “social regulation” (2004) which flow from 
underlying social institutions.   
 
Third, women have been a core focus of microfinance with considerable debate about whether this 
has been primarily an instrumental focus or in fact empowering and this goes to the heart of the 
relational dimensions of gender.  However, inclusive financial markets approaches leaves gender and 
women’s empowerment perspective outside the core of the debate.  Since gender is a key social 
institution that regulates these markets, the paper goes on to outline how gender analysis could 
begin to be addressed if inclusive financial market development were to seek to address the 
disjuncture presented.  
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2.  From microfinance to inclusive financial markets  
The first shift in policy in microfinance over the past two decades involved moving from the “poverty 
lending approach” to the “financial systems approach” in the 1990s (Robinson 2001:22).  This  
involved removing subsidies that were directed towards the recipients of credit and instead giving 
them to service providers in order to build ‘sustainable’1 financial systems.  However, within the 
Washington Consensus framework of “getting prices right” subsidies are only tenable when there are 
clear market failures.  FFA takes the view that the extent of subsidy required and how it is best 
provided are still open to question, especially since welfare impacts are still unclear and there is 
scope for service delivery without subsidy, since many MFIs have demonstrated financial viability.  
These arguments are complemented by evidence that the effects of direct access to financial services 
for the poor are less substantial than the indirect effects via economic growth and its effect on 
product and labour markets.   One such study (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2007)2 finds that 60% of 
the poverty impact on the poorest 20% arises from this indirect effect compared to 40% of the direct 
effect.    Indeed the Banking the Poor study (World Bank 2008a) also suggests that access is 
promoted by formal jobs rather than any other route so adding further grist to this mill.  However, 
some studies have argued that direct access to services is important if inequality is not to increase 
(Jalilian and Kirkpatrick 2005 ; Honohan 2007).  
FFA clearly signals the shift in emphasis which brings microfinance policy into the context of financial 
sector development by concluding that “financial sector reforms that promote broader access to 
financial services should be at the core of the development agenda”….”Government policies should 
focus on building sound financial institutions, encouraging competition (including foreign entry), and 
establishing sound prudential regulations to provide the private sector with appropriate incentive 
structures and broaden access” (World Bank, 2008: p17).   
 
The M4P approach on the other hand is focused on effective intervention and reflects a concern 
among particular donors who have been active in microfinance for an approach which enables them 
to work with the mainstream financial sector but retains a poverty focus.  While the motivation can 
be seen in the original concerns of the Washington Consensus to get markets working, it is modified 
by the concerns of the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ for poverty reduction and the understanding 
that without adequate structured opportunities for poor people this recipe is set to increase 
inequality (World Bank 2006).   
 
                                                 
1
 I put this in quotation marks as the recent financial crisis clearly highlights the need to question assumptions 
about what the sustainability of financial systems means especially when based on profitability indicators.   
2
 This study is also the central one referred to in Finance for All, which was also written by Beck.   
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M4P is clearly based in new institutional economics (Ferrand, Gibson et al. 2004) and focuses on 
identifying transactions occurring in markets along with the institutions and infrastructure that 
supports them.  Intervention is focussed on analysing how these markets may work more effectively 
by adjusting rules and regulations and facilitating provision of information and services that can 
reduce transactions costs for participants and be financially sustainable in the longer term.  
Many recent approaches to private sector development have been termed “new minimalist” 
(Altenburg and Drachenfels 2006) in their combination of four elements: pro-poor property rights (in 
particular tenure policy); simplification of procedures and regulations (highlighted by the rise of the 
World Bank’s “Doing Business” Reports); microfinance development through an enabling 
environment and commercialisation rather than direct service provision; and finally emphasis on the 
role of business development services that enable the private sector to develop – especially small 
and medium enterprises .  The M4P approach combines aspects of these elements but is less 
minimalist in that it sees the potential for their pro-active combination to be facilitated by 
interveners, it seeks a middle way between liberalisation and reform at the broadest level and donor 
/ government intervention which engages directly in markets and with businesses.     
 
Analytically M4P sees the market as consisting of three aspects (DFID/SDC 2009b). First, is analysis of 
the core market in terms of its actors, structure, trends and performance.   This is now increasingly 
operationalised in commodity markets through the use of value chain analysis (Miehlbradt and 
McVay 2006).  The role of poor people in these markets as producers, consumers and employees is 
also analysed.  Second, analysis of institutions looks at general rules such as contracts, property, 
health and safety; sector-specific rules (eg banking law, or telecommunications laws); and non-
statutory requirements and regulations such as those that exist in the form of codes of conduct.  It 
requires an analysis of how these affect the market.  In addition they highlight the need to look at 
how informal institutions affect the market, pointing out that it is often informal rules that govern 
arrangements when formal regulation is weak.  For example, reliance on existing social and business 
networks may limit the capacity to break out and to take up new business opportunities.  Finally, the 
support services and infrastructure available in the market and how they operate is important.  This 
covers, professional services such as accounting and training; “embedded” services that are part of 
other commercial transactions (eg. payment arrangements and availability of stock on credit; 
supplier provision of information and training) infrastructure availability and public services such as 
licensing and regulations.   
 
With this analysis, the task of M4P is to consider how the market could work more effectively and 
identify the weaknesses to achieving this concentrating on the rules to be developed and enforced; 
the services and infrastructure to be provided and how these elements can be sustainably developed 
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in terms of payment for them.  This, it argues, has been a key missing feature of previous 
approaches.  Hence, drawing on the new institutional economics (NIE), the M4P approach has its 
primary focus on lowering transactions costs to facilitate expanding markets resulting in improved 
access for poor people, better returns to labour and products, reduced prices, increased choice and 
reduced risk.  The recognition that formal and informal institutions affect markets and the regulatory 
emphasis is an important development.  A market that works for the poor is “one which expands the 
choices available to poor people and produces outcomes that benefit the poor” (DFID 2005b:10) 
judged in terms of access to markets and overcoming exclusion; affordability of purchases; returns to 
products and labour; increased choice and reduced risk, with these effects leading to increased 
participation over time.   
 
However, the approach does not clearly define who “the poor” are.  Mendoza and Thelen (2008) also 
argue that inclusive market approaches should reach the poor, suggesting that many do not, and 
suggest the use of the US$2 per day consumption measure.  This therefore suggests a poverty focus 
that is defined by expenditure measures, with the lowering of transactions costs the means through 
which inclusivity is achieved.  The core M4P documents do however, recognise that that poor people 
have “weaker informal networks and links to government patronage” (DFID/SDC 2009b:8) but as has 
also been noted by Meyer-Stammer (2006) there does not appear to be a coherent analysis of 
poverty and how this relates to market failure.  Similarly, there is no discussion of the causes of 
poverty or, more specifically,  the causes of exclusion from markets, within the inclusive financial 
markets discourse. How then can institutional development to promote an ‘enabling environment’ 
and supportive institutions be understood if what is ‘disabling’ with respect to inclusion has not been 
identified?   
 
 
3.  Residual and relational analyses of poverty  
 
The focus of NIE analysis on which M4P is based is the information and transactions costs which 
institutional arrangements produce and which mean that prices are not market clearing.  Factors 
which influence prices (especially technology) may then produce opportunities for collective action 
as new institutional arrangements become beneficial to players.  The NIE does not have an explicit 
theory of poverty but sees poverty in income terms and poor people as a residual category who lack 
the income to engage in a variety of markets.   Deploying the NIE into approaches to M4P therefore 
primarily sees the route to inclusion as the lowering of prices through lower information and 
transactions costs, with potential for co-ordination where this has failed.   It therefore fits with an 
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approach to poverty that sees poor people as a residual category who are simply left out due to low 
incomes (see for example Mendoza and Thelen (2008)).   
 
The analysis of poverty has expanded significantly over the last two decades from a focus on income 
to embrace its multi-dimensionality through approaches such as basic needs, entitlements, human 
development and capabilities and how these have expanded to dimensions which pay attention to 
rights and freedoms for individuals to participate in society (Sen 1999 ; World Bank 2000 ; Saith 
2007).  The concept of social exclusion has also contributed to this from its base in European social 
policy discourse where it is primarily concerned with the way people are unable to participate in 
what is regarded as ‘normal’ activity, particularly in terms of labour markets and state welfare 
systems.  It has in turn been much debated with different aspects being emphasised by different 
writers (Saith 2007).  More broadly the social exclusion  approach has contributed to the emergence 
of an understanding of poverty which is “relational” in contrast to one which is “residual” and sees 
the poor as simply left out (Bernstein 1992).   
 
Saith (2007) highlights five key aspects of the contribution of social exclusion literature in comparison 
to monetary definitions of poverty.  First, it is multi-dimensional and recognises how, for example, 
unemployment may not simply lead to income poverty but affects people’s social networks and self-
esteem,  Second, it is relational in focusing not solely on the individual or household but how these 
relate to groups and organisations in the society.  Third, it is relative in the sense that exclusion 
occurs relative to others in the society and therefore must be evaluated relative to what others in 
the society do. Fourth, it is dynamic and concerned with how people fare over time and inter-
generationally since exclusion can affect their longer term potential.   Finally, it is concerned with the 
process through which poverty outcomes are produced in the sense that it looks at the way 
particular institutions may generate exclusion and hence moves the emphasis from the outcomes 
alone to the means through which these outcomes arise enabling particular paths to poverty to be 
identified.   According to Saith (2007), this emphasis on process is one of the main contributions it 
makes.   
 
The application of the concept to developing countries is not straightforward and has raised 
analytical problems since what is ‘normal’ is not necessarily easy to identify and in some societies 
exclusion is part of the social structure  - e.g. through the caste system in India (Stewart, Laderchi et 
al. 2007).  However, the concept has heavily influenced the discussion of poverty and this has in the 
main focused on the processes involved.  Examples of its adoption into the mainstream poverty 
discourse are evident through the widely referenced Voices of the Poor study.  This states that:  “[I]n 
describing illbeing and the bad life, poor people and especially women, often express powerlessness 
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vis-à-vis employers the state and markets; their inability to get a fair deal; their inability to take a 
stand against abuse, lying and being cheated; their inability to access market opportunities” 
(Narayan, Chambers et al. 2000:265).    The World Development Report 2000 (WDR 2000) (World 
Bank 2000) which was heavily influenced by the “Voices of the Poor” study recognises that poverty is 
multidimensional and the result of economic, political and social processes interacting with each 
other. Moreover, the role of social institutions such as gender, age, ethnicity, race, caste and religion 
in creating these processes of disadvantage and powerlessness were well understood.  Its policy 
proposals to expand opportunity, promote empowerment and security also recognise the role of 
social institutions (especially gender) and the need to tackle social barriers borne of inequitable 
social structures.   
 
However, the chapter of WDR 2000 entitled “Making Markets Work Better for Poor People” is 
interesting for its primary emphasis (though not articulated as such) on creating opportunities rather 
than addressing how these dimensions of empowerment and security affect how markets work.  In 
this context too then we see the multi-dimensional analysis of causes of poverty but an inability to 
translate this into an understanding of the implications for policy and intervention in relation to 
markets.  The subsequent WDR 2002 “Building institutions for markets” does recognise the role 
social institutions, norms and networks play in producing exclusion from both formal and informal 
institutions for some people – but it does not systematically connect this to an analysis of poverty 
that articulates how these problems are to be addressed.  It offers only rather broad statements 
about strengthening human capital if markets are to work better for poor people (World Bank 
2002:26).   
 
Moreover, seeing exclusion as a function of the way markets are structured and total exclusion as 
only a small part of the problem necessitates a closer examination of the terms and conditions of 
poor people’s incorporation into, or marginalisation within, markets which may not be favourable – a 
concept which the term ‘adverse incorporation’ (Wood 2003) usefully captures.  Of course such an 
idea is not entirely new but draws on the analysis of political economy.  Indeed, while M4P 
statements do refer to power relations as sources of market failure (DFID 2005b:6; DFID/SDC 2009b) 
they are not  systematically integrated into the analysis.   
 
Responding to the need to develop poverty analysis that brings in power relations, Tilly’s approach 
involves looking at “interactional” explanations of inequality in order to move away from the 
individualistic focus of poverty definitions and discourse.  In this he looks at distinctions between 
categories of people and how interactions (processes) between these paired categories of “greater 
and lesser beneficiaries” operates in terms of inequality generating mechanisms of “exploitation and 
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opportunity hoarding” (ibid:56).  He points out that it is not simply an issue of the ability of some 
groups to “enlist the effort of others in production of value by means of a resource” but also to 
“exclude others from the value of their effort”,  and opportunity hoarding as the way an “in group” is 
able to retain control of a resource.  These processes result in “durable inequality” because 
categorical distinctions are reinforced when they work alongside existing unequal categories and 
mobility across these boundaries does not change the boundaries but rather who benefits from 
them.  He goes on to identify types of resources which have historically been key to generating 
inequality such as:  coercive means (weapons, jails, violence); labour; animals (especially 
domesticated); land (including natural resources); institutions which maintain commitment such as 
religious, kin and others; machines; financial capital; information; media access and scientific 
knowledge (ibid:61).    
 
Mosse seeks to bring a clearer analysis of power into this approach beyond what he sees as Tilly’s 
somewhat functional analysis (ibid:1163).  To do this, he draws on Lukes (2005) “agenda setting” 
second dimension of power pointing out the ways in which political process results in some issues 
being put on the agenda while others are “organised out”.  Political processes systematically 
marginalise the interests of poor people essentially because they lack representation.   However, the 
process of gaining access to formal political representation is in itself highly problematic as it 
invariably involves the “concession of people’s interests to the definitions and categories of 
outsiders” (ibid: 1172) whether via party politics or civil society movements, where, their objective 
may instead be to disrupt these categories and definitions (as in the case of adivasis in India that he 
discusses).  He takes the argument further to incorporate Lukes’ “preference-shaping” third 
dimension of power.   This refers to the deep and subtle processes through which perceptions and 
preferences are actually shaped and in which ‘non-decisions’ are not even recognised as such.   
Mosse uses it to argue that “structural inequalities of power produce self-enforcing effects on 
individual behaviour” (ibid: 1170) in the way that these inequalities themselves influence desires, 
subjectivity and agency which in turn contribute to the failure of collective action against political 
exclusion.  Hence “extreme vulnerability and the search for security allies the immediate interests of 
poor people to those of their exploiters, lending stability to wider systems that perpetuate 
disadvantage” (ibid:1172) 
 
To the extent that previous work on markets has addressed adverse inclusion, its core focus has been 
on inter-locking markets seeking to explain what were seen as exploitative credit relationships linking 
land and labour (Bhaduri 1977 ; Rao 1980 ; Bhaduri 1981).  Neo-classical institutional economics has 
explained these as functional institutions which solve problems of asymmetric information and 
incomplete contracts (Von Pischke, Adams et al. 1983 ; Hoff, Braverman et al. 1993 ; Adams 1994).   
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The political economy approach on the other hand, sees the NIE analysis of these arrangements as 
failing to recognise that the means by which such information is built up over time can itself be an 
instrument of economic power and present agents with difficulties exiting these relationships (Bell 
1993 ; Olsen 1994 ; Harriss-White 1999:272) and that these relationships therefore result in 
“financial repression from below” in markets (McGregor 1994:276).   
 
While land3 and labour arrangements have been a focus of South Asian political economy and which 
have been particularly related to credit markets, they are but two of the items on Tilly’s list of 
resources which are central to processes of exploitation or opportunity hoarding.  The deployment of 
these resources to produce relational poverty clearly varies across space and time.  So, for example, 
the use of violence and coercion is evident in ‘market’ creation in Africa for labour (slaves; 
apartheid), land and commodities (timber, minerals etc).  Indeed, the ways in which illfare rather 
than welfare have historically been generated in an African context4 - including as a result of mass 
violent deaths and injuries arising from political and military activities - has resulted in them being 
characterised as “insecurity regimes” (in contrast to European “welfare regimes”) (Bevan 2004).  The 
extensive literature on state failure, weak states, and neo-patrimonialism (Bayart, Ellis et al. 1999 ; 
Chabal and Daloz 1999 ; Walle 2003) and the varied forms of accumulation these give rise to are 
analyses of the role of coercion amongst others in what are processes of exploitation and 
opportunity hoarding.  The relational dimensions of these processes also lie in the way  categories 
such as those of race and tribe were created (Mamdani cited in Bebbington et al (2008)) and how 
these were written into law and created the bases for discrimination in how people were governed.  
Bevan (2008) also cites Mamdani’s analysis of ‘bifurcated states’  in that the majority were governed 
by ‘decentralised despotism’ while a small elite were citizens of a ‘modern’ state consistent with 
these strategies.  Moncrieffe (2008) indicates how violence was a feature of pre-colonial as well as 
colonial relationships among ethnic groups in Uganda , as well as within them in terms of gender 
relations, for example: patterns which have extended into post-colonial experience.  The 
construction of markets in Africa, as in other contexts, is therefore underpinned by processes and 
historical arrangements for inclusion and exclusion through both coercion and relational category 
construction although the links to these analyses are not yet well developed.   
 
While ways in which barriers to financial access can originate in discriminatory policies are 
recognised in the inclusive finance literature (Claessens 2006 ; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2008) they 
are as yet inadequately theorised  for their role in creating exclusion or adverse inclusion. Political 
                                                 
3
 While African is seen as a region of low population densities and abundant land, this is clearly now changing with rapid 
population growth.   
4
 Violence and coercion have of course been part of processes in South Asia also, while land and labour arrangements are 
changing as population growth occurs in Africa, especially in more highly productive zones.   
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economy approaches, on the other hand, see these market relations as fundamentally exploitative 
and requiring that markets are restructured in order to liberate poor people from their entrenched 
disadvantage.  Relational approaches to poverty analysis are broadening this analysis to understand 
how poverty and inequality are created through the wider interaction of groups of people and the 
multi-dimensional terms on which they are either apparently excluded or incorporated.  Despite 
occasional mentions of the role of such power relations in the M4P literature (DFID 2005b:6ff) it has 
failed to incorporate this dimension into its analysis because it is primarily driven by a theoretical 
framework that sees poverty as residual.   The inclusive financial markets agenda therefore suffers an 
analytical disjuncture between its discourse and its analysis of poverty.   
 
 
4. Institutions, markets and social regulation  
 
Given this disjuncture, the inclusive financial markets agenda also lacks a counterpart framework for 
recognising the way these relational dimensions underpin institutional development for markets.    
While institutions have been a core analytical concern for development economists over many 
decades, the recent rise of interest in mainstream economics in analysing the role of institutions in 
economic development has largely been associated with North’s (1990) contribution  (Bardhan 2007 
) and the recent literature by  economists such as Rodrik and Acemoglu exploring the role of property 
rights; regulatory institutions; institutions for macroeconomic stabilization and for social insurance 
(Acemoglu, Johnson et al. 2001 ; Rodrik, Subramanian et al. 2004).  Specifically with respect to 
financial markets, Fergusson’s review (2006) indicates that the main focus has been protection for 
creditor’s with a balance to be sought since too high a level of protection can impede incentives and 
risk taking. The role of politics in FSD has also been explored, while competitive political institutions 
support FSD by limiting state power, powerful political interests can oppose reform and therefore it 
may only occur when in their interests (Rajan and Zingales 2003). 
 
While this research has brought institutions to the forefront of the mainstream economic 
development debate, critics have pointed out theoretical problems involved in the approach.5 Chang 
(2005) questions why institutions such as those of property rights; regulation; macroeconomic 
stabilisation; and social insurance used by Rodrik and others should so often be the centre of these 
analyses.  He argues that this is not a theoretically informed approach.   The key issue for economic 
development with respect to property rights is the “ability to decide which property rights to protect 
to what extent under what conditions” if improvements in the use of resources are to be supported 
                                                 
5
 Criticism has also focussed on the use of instrumental variables to attempt to disentangle the relationships 
between institutions and their outcomes, see for example (Glaeser, Porta et al. 2004) but this does not affect the 
substance of the discussion here. 
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(ibid:15).  Hence, approaches which focus on particular forms of institution are reductionist.  He 
further argues that there is confusion between the analysis of the form (eg judiciary) of the 
institutions and their functions (eg rule of law).  Since the same function may result from different 
forms it is problematic to focus on form as much of the literature does.   
 
Moreover, the institutions of social structure such as those of gender, class, religion and ethnicity 
that have rarely been the focus for economists (Harriss-White 2004).  Rodrik (2000:3) has recognised 
that the market economy is embedded in non-market institutions, but that there is no direct or 
“unique mapping” between them  but that these non-market institutions are not there to serve the 
logic of market institutions.  Using Chang’s distinction between form and function, we can argue that 
these social institutions have multiple forms but their function is to create social difference and 
processes through which inclusion and exclusion in the economy operates.  These institutions 
therefore play a role in creating poverty through this function.  The need then is to incorporate the 
influence of these institutions into analysis of the operation of the economy and markets.   While this 
is in itself a major theoretical project, what follows are insights from existing work that offer 
directions for such an analysis, and which suggest how the role of social institutions is central to 
understanding how markets work for poor people. 
 
A market can be defined as “an institution in which a significant number of commodities of a 
particular, reasonably well-defined type are regularly exchanged.  They contain rules and structures 
that pattern these exchange negotiations and transactions” (Hodgson 2001:274). The theoretical 
work for identifying and analysing the way social institutions contribute to these rules and structures 
lies mainly in the contribution of economic anthropology and sociology.  The substantive tradition of 
economic anthropology has sought to identify the influence of social institutions on exchange in 
markets with Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness as central in this regard (Polanyi 2001).  However, 
this has been regarded by many as an over-socialized account in which social structure plays too 
deterministic an influence on action.  Alternative notions, such as Granovetter’s account of social 
embeddedness (1992:62) allow for the interaction of structure and agency and hence degrees of 
“distrust, opportunism and disorder” to be present.   
 
Theories of the embeddedness of markets in social institutions and relations and their power 
dimensions have underpinned a range of empirical research on their role in markets.  Some of these 
studies have explored both the role of particular forms of social institution, such as gender and caste, 
while others have recognised that the function of these various forms of social structure is to create 
market fragmentation.  So labour markets have been shown to be heavily influenced by gender 
relations (Folbre 1994) while Rogaly demonstrates the roles of class, caste and gender in labour 
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hiring arrangements in West Bengal (Rogaly, 1997), and Figueroa demonstrates a racially segmented 
labour market in the case of Peru (Copestake 2006).  The influence of gender in structuring access to 
and control over land and hence exchange based on this has been documented by Agarwal (1994).  
The role of class and caste in credit markets is demonstrated by Harriss-White (1996), Olsen (1994) 
and gender in credit markets by Johnson (2004).  Grain markets have been shown to be influenced by 
class (Crow 2001), gender (Pujo 1996 ; Harriss-White 1998), race (Bernstein 1996), and markets for 
coir to be influenced by caste and gender (Rammohan and Sundaresan 2003). 
 
Harriss-White argues that these underlying social institutions are derived from ‘primordial identity’ 
and operate both inside the economy to regulate it while also operating outside it in other domains 
of social life, and at the same time are continually contested (Harriss-White 2004).  Her study of the 
Indian economy shows how the labour market is riven with the influence of social class, gender, 
religion, caste and space which interact with each other to create a “socially regulated” (2004) 
economy.  In introducing the term ‘social regulation’, Harriss-White moves beyond the notion of 
embeddedness to allow for the operation of what she calls “fields of power” (2004:5) which emanate 
both from inside and outside the economy.   Although she does not refer to Bourdieu’s use of the 
term field, she is using the term to recognise the diversity of forms through which power is exercised.  
The term therefore captures the means through which the dimensions of power  - evident above in 
relation to Lukes  - originating in underlying social structures and institutions emanate into the 
economy.   
 
Even where it may be argued that formal institutional structures are in place, it can be understood 
that they in turn are “nested” (Ostrom 2005) in underlying sets of rules such that these allow the 
exercise of social power and their influence permeates both through formal and informal institutions 
(White 1993) .  For example, patriarchal gender relations can be institutionalised in discriminatory 
property laws, restrictions on tasks or work as well as ideologies of subordination.  The actual 
processes through which markets are in fact “instituted”  (Polanyi 2001) in particular contexts are as 
yet poorly understood. Recent studies at a micro level also start to reveal the complex processes of 
institutional change that arise in the way ‘informal’ institutions  articulate and interact with ‘formal’ 
or bureaucratic institutions in ways that are messy and complex.  In this way rather than rationalistic 
individuals, “institutions do the thinking” (p15) in the way that institutions are “created through  a 
process of bricolage – gathering and applying analogies and styles of thought already part of existing 
institutions” and in ways that adapt them to socially embedded arrangements (Cleaver 2002).  In the 
specific context of microfinance Rankin argues that the somewhat counter-intuitive case of the 
successful building of microfinance in Vietnam has arisen in an environment which appears to have 
got the institutions wrong, is a result of “institutional assemblage” with seemingly quite disparate 
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institutions being brought into play – ranging from those of state socialist thinking through to gender 
ideology (Rankin 2008).  However, while the dynamic processes of the permeation of social 
institutions within markets are clear in a wide range of contexts, the analysis of social regulation is 
particularly appropriate where the informal sector is dominant (Harriss-White 2004).   
 
This discussion therefore raises a number of challenges for the project of building inclusive financial 
markets.  First, social institutions and the power relations connected to them are means through 
which poverty is itself created and reproduced in markets and in markets in which institutional 
development is intended to take place, they may be predominantly operating in the context of 
widespread informality where the logic of regulation by social structures dominates.    Moreover, the 
process of market creation is a complex and messy process of “bricolages” and “assemblages” in 
which diverse institutional forms are articulated into new arrangements.  The implication is that 
making markets work better for poor people requires that the regulatory role of social institutions as 
a cause of poverty through the processes that they bring to bear in the economy needs to be 
identified and incorporated into inclusive financial market analysis and interventions in order for it to 
be effective.       
 
 
5.  Addressing the role of social regulation in markets:  the case of gender  
 
The focus of the discussion over the impact of microcredit on women’s empowerment has been 
oriented towards a discussion of the outcomes  - whether or not women are empowered - rather 
than the gender relations involved.  The literature has debated the extent to which women have 
achieved degrees of empowerment either on multi-dimensional indicators(Hashemi, Schuler et al. 
1996) or their own assessment (Kabeer 2001), especially  given its potential to put women in the 
midst of conflictive intra-household relations to their detriment (Schuler, Hashemi et al. 1998 ; 
Rahman 1999). That the evidence on outcomes is mixed (Mayoux 2001 ; Johnson 2005) is 
unsurprising given the varied circumstances of gender relations involved which differ between 
women, in relation to a wide range of other dimensions of social difference (caste; age; class; 
ethnicity etc) as well as between geographical contexts and which result in highly varied processes of 
relational exclusion and poverty creation.   
 
The empowerment focus has been particularly problematic because it obscures the gender relations 
that women are engaged in when managing and negotiating the resources and opportunities these 
programmes offer both inside the household and beyond it in markets and society more generally 
(Johnson 2005).  Moreover, as the debate shifts to inclusive financial market development, the 
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empowerment dimension has little resonance with the language of institutional reform and 
transactions costs reductions.  FFA rehearses the arguments about women’s empowerment (p124) 
with a minor mention of gender in relation to creating indicators of barriers to access that looks at 
three dimensions  - physical access, affordability and eligibility (p40).    However, the treatment of 
them as “customer characteristics” does not recognise the deep and embedded ways in which 
gender (or age) structures market opportunities, affects regulatory and legislative institutions, and 
hence also affects transactions costs.  The recent M4P documentation does not address gender as an 
analytical dimension of working in markets, it only refers to gender in its operational guide where 
this might be a concern for some implementers (DFID/SDC 2009a:51).  
 
An analytical starting point is needed which can allow for both a structured analysis of gender 
dimensions of exclusion or existing inclusion and allow for a relational approach to addressing these 
dynamics.    The approach draws on Johnson (2004) - which in turn draws on gendered market 
analysis in Africa and Asia (Pujo 1996 ; Harriss-White 1998)  - and has two main dimensions.  First, it 
considers the demand side for finance by analysing the gender norms that surround intra-household 
activities and how these determine the intra-household gender dynamics of income and expenditure.  
This builds on the long standing  anthropological literature on intra-household dynamics of resource 
and income allocation which in particular has critiqued unitary household models (Whitehead 1981 ; 
Kabeer 1994).  In addition, this needs to be extended to the gendered analysis of women’s market 
engagement.  Second, is an analysis of how gender norms affect women’s engagement with the 
demand for and supply of financial services.  A range of norms, including those of property rights in 
particular, affect women’s access and control of finance.   
 
Gender analysis can securely start by analysing what men and women do – the gender division of 
labour – first within the household as a site of production and reproduction.  Economic analysis then 
needs to analyse the patterns of rewards to this activity.   How are the income flows from these 
activities allocated?6  In Central Kenya, Johnson (2004) found that returns for different activities were 
allocated to individuals depending on a range of factors including scale, returns and the presence of 
men.  Expenditure responsibilities are then also examined for their gendered patterns.  Since savings 
and credit are means of moving the time at which funds are available, the need to bridge between 
flows of income and expenditure then determines the demand for financial services in the form of 
saving or loan facilities by men and women (Johnson 2004).   The income streams which men 
controlled in Central Kenya were large and periodic, even irregular, compared to women’s, which 
tended to be smaller but more frequent.  This meant that women rather than men were more likely 
                                                 
6
 This is essentially an extension of the Harvard gender analysis tools into returns and income, and adds a further analysis of 
expenditure responsibilities.  
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to have access to the regular contributions that informal group-based financial mechanisms required.  
Since men’s expenditure responsibilities tended also to be lumpy, and in many cases tied to 
particular times of year, this meant they were more reliant on formal financial institutions to cater to 
these needs as groups were on the whole unable to cater for them  
 
Extending beyond household production activities to trade in markets also demonstrates gendered 
patterns of market engagement.  Grain marketing systems in West Africa and India have been shown 
to be patterned by complex gendered patterns which also interact with a range of other social 
differences such as ethnicity , age, religion, family, and the role of the state (Harriss-White 1998).  
These affect patterns of returns and accumulation opportunities.  The demand for finance in such 
situations is influenced both by past accumulation through production and trade as well as access to 
finance influencing these opportunities.  Harriss-White reports that returns among women traders 
were more highly unequal than for men in Guinea but that while men dominated the grain trade in 
Hausa, Nigeria, there was still a lot of differentiation among women traders.  With this wider 
perspective on gendered economic opportunities, Goetz and Sen Gupta’s (1996) finding that women 
handed over their loans to husbands and other male family members is also better understood.  In 
Bangladesh, women had few opportunities to directly invest in an economy that is male dominated 
due to women’s relative seclusion, returns overall would likely be higher in those male run activities 
than in the very few and small scale market opportunities open to them.  Under these circumstances 
women were often dependent on husband’s or son’s to sell their produce where they undertook the 
production activities themselves eg. the production and sale of puffed rice.  Investment 
opportunities for expanded production are therefore likely to be limited, and investment in a 
husband’s or son’s rickshaw or other business therefore a more viable opportunity.  
 
Seen in these contexts, microfinance programmes that anticipate that accumulating savings or taking 
credit is the sole constraint to expanding economic activities that women themselves control are 
clearly problematic.  At the household level and beyond, the range of gendered barriers to entry into 
production or markets are many and varied.  Within the household are the many gendered norms 
regarding the division of productive and reproductive labour; the extent to which access to 
productive resources (land, labour, technology etc) can be developed are often sites of bargaining, 
negotiation and contestation.  For market engagement,  the constraints include skills, mobility, 
access to inputs, social networks, access to market space and so on and these are evident, for 
example, in the case of microfinance in Malawi (Johnson 2005).  Indeed, the NIE’s analysis of adverse 
selection as a problem in financial markets may in fact be gendered if women on the whole 
undertake projects that are less risky in their profile than men because they face such constraints.  
This is not to say that they are without risks and many of these risks have specific gender dimensions.  
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But since the economy as a whole is gendered in terms of market opportunities for these reasons, it 
is necessarily the case that the investment opportunities open to women and men differ in terms of 
both return and risk.  Further, as the above discussion illustrates, market entry barriers may be 
alleviated or exacerbated by ethnicity, age, religion and so on.  Therefore the particular 
circumstances and constraints of women for whom microfinance is expected to produce financial 
market inclusion need to be carefully diagnosed.    
 
A second and related dimension of this gender analysis is of the social norms that surround and 
perpetuate gendered engagement with financial services.  These range from those that are relatively 
well understood and may be formalised such as those of property rights, or men’s approval of the 
use of household chattels as collateral to those that relate to expectations of acceptable behaviour.  
While norms regarding property rights have long constrained women’s ability to borrow from the 
formal sector, it is the fact that alternative norms of women’s sociality that have been invoked 
through group-based microfinance that is in part responsible for the development of this sector.   
 
In this regard Johnson (2004) points out how gendered differences in the use of informal savings and 
credit groups in Central Kenya reflect different socialisation processes which enable women to 
experience shame as a sanction to non-repayment in ways that men do not.  The strength of 
underlying social norms appears to underpin the more widely recognised experience of microfinance 
noted above that women make better repayers than men.  Women in that context noted that men 
had no shame in relation to not paying ROSCA group contributions.  This goes to the heart of another 
key concept of transactions costs analysis in that it suggests that moral hazard is gendered (Johnson, 
2004).7  The implications of this for financial market development may be significant: costs may be 
cut by targeting women. 
 
In the light of the above discussion, an understanding of market development should be informed by 
an understanding of institutional “bricolage”.  While this two-fold analysis highlights the way gender 
as a social structure presents foundations on which market development will take place, agency in 
the deployment of existing institutions including that of gender ideologies may arise from a range of 
actors whether state or citizens either to promote or contest their development, as Rankin has 
shown in the case of Vietnam.   The design of programmes may allow space for agency through the 
promotion of solidarity and space to reflect on their own experiences of gender subordination, or 
may deploy a more minimalist approach which elides such spaces (Mayoux 1999 ; Rankin 2002 ; 
Copestake, Greeley et al. 2005).   
                                                 
7
 Indeed Yaqub (1995) argued that increasing levels of default by women in Bangladesh were a sign of 
increasing empowerment!  
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The need for formal regulation to overcome gender biases in markets has increasingly become the 
norm in labour markets for example, even though overcoming exclusion and discrimination on 
grounds of sex have been demonstrably intractable even where formal anti-discrimination legislation 
exists.  Even in developed countries the influence of the underlying norms of gender relations are 
ongoing in labour market remuneration patterns.  Addressing this and other sources of social 
regulation such as ethnicity, caste, religion, age and disability require not solely work on the supply 
of institutions but also on the demand side (Nino-Zarazua 2006).  Since the preference-shaping role 
of these social institutions is deep and pervasive and takes more than the stroke of a legislative pen 
to change.  Hence, campaigns for attitudinal change along with test cases being used to establish 
precedents in law also require ongoing support.   
 
Hence, the analytical basis of addressing gender as a form of exclusion in financial (or other) markets, 
requires understanding both the economic dimensions such as the gender division of labour and 
control of income and expenditure, the gender dimensions of market engagement and how these 
relate to scale and returns; and also the social norms at a range of levels which may render both 
opportunities and constraints to economic activity and market engagement.  In such a context, 
inclusion may be on disadvantageous terms and the perpetuator of poverty rather than its alleviator.  
Moreover, empowerment through engagement is not necessarily a linear process since gains in one 
dimension may produce trade-offs in others (increased income earned by women results in an 
increased overall work burden and/or the withdrawal of contributions by men (Johnson 2005) .  The 
circumstances and dynamics of these processes need to be the focus of concern if inclusion is to 
produce the impacts to which interventions aspire.   
 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has identified a key disjuncture in the relationship between the discourse of inclusive 
financial markets and its analysis.  Markets are implicated in the underlying causes of people’s 
poverty through the ways in which people are adversely incorporated into them or excluded from 
them through relational processes.  If approaches to inclusive financial market development seek to 
improve their functioning they must analyse and address these causes.  While there is some 
recognition of the role of formal and informal institutions in markets, these do not go far enough in 
identifying the role of these relational processes, particularly of social institutions, in creating poverty 
and inequality.   
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While the actual processes through which markets are in fact “instituted” have not yet been 
adequately developed to link to approaches to market development using institutional theory, the 
concept of social regulation is particularly helpful in offering a view of the role of underlying social 
institutions in their impact on the market.  It is based in an analysis of the embeddedness of markets 
in social institutions and relations, and it offers a clear analysis of the means through which social 
institutions structure market exchange through both informal and formal means.  In addition there is 
already a sound body of empirical evidence using this approach and which can be further developed. 
Approaches to inclusive financial market development can and must therefore bring the role of social 
institutions in structuring market relationships into the core of their analysis, clearly linking them to 
the processes through which poverty and exclusion is produced and reproduced through them in the 
first place.   
 
The policy interventions required are not necessarily obvious but they clearly must go beyond 
dealing with the regulatory supply side and offering light touch facilitation.  At a minimum they must 
extend their analysis to understand how market opportunities are structured and formal regulatory 
environments are patterned by social regulatory structures to constrain poor people’s equitable 
participation in financial markets.  Going further, interventions must incorporate strategies for 
empowerment and engagement with social regulatory structures by facilitating agency through the 
myriad types of education and training programmes for women, minorities and excluded groups that 
have long been part and parcel of development activity.  Struggles for rights on a wider scale are 
obviously also central to influencing the way regulatory structures – especially social ones - operate.   
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